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The following review appeared in the July 2025 issue of CHOICE. The review is for your internal use only. Please review our Permission and Reprints Guidelines or email ChoiceHelp@ala.org.
Humanities
Philosophy
Given the current state of social and political division and unrest in the United States and elsewhere, including tensions around race and ongoing forms of racism, Myisha Cherry’s The Case for Rage is a timely and practical text on how anger of a specific variety can bolster anti-racist action. Cherry (Univ. of California, Riverside) is an academic philosopher who has written extensively about emotions. This specific work comes at a time when many people might be wondering how their own anger might be productively channeled toward making a better world.
While anger is often considered a negative emotion with the potential for adverse outcomes, Cherry questions this popular assumption. As she notes, this view often supports calls to eliminate or replace anger with another emotion, considering it only a negative reaction. However, such appeals are premised on what the author calls a “broad-strokes view” of anger (p. 13). This view depicts all anger as negative, unproductive, and potentially poised to cause harm. In contrast, Cherry adopts an “image variation view” of anger, which means considering that not all anger is equal. Some anger, rather than being a negative reaction, is in fact an appropriate and productive response to a given event (i.e., an injustice) with the capacity to propel positive action. It is this perspective that The Case for Rage seeks to analyze and unpack.
Cherry maintains that within the image variation view of anger, some forms of anger are of greater moral concern than others. She adopts the work of the Black feminist scholar and poet Audre Lorde in discussing a version of anger that is not only acceptable but also worthy of cultivation. This form of anger, “Lordean rage,” is fitting and appropriate in anti-racist struggle (p. 5). This is because in the face of racism, particularly persistent and ongoing racism, feeling anger is a correct reaction to the circumstances. Moreover, Cherry states, “Lordean rage can be morally appropriate when it respects the humanity of the wrongdoer and aims to create a better world rather than tear the wrongdoer down in the name of virtue signaling” (p. 37).
Thus, Cherry contextualizes Lordean rage as aiming to transform the world. Unlike other varieties of rage outlined in this study—narcissistic rage, which “shows an indifference to the suffering of others and projects a sense of superiority” (p. 23); ressentiment rage, which “reproduces oppressive actions” (p. 23); wipe rage, which “aims to eliminate others through hate” (p. 23); and rogue rage, which “blames almost everyone for” injustice (pp. 16–17)—Lordean rage is a response to “repeated forms of racial wrongdoing or at systematically reinforced racial wrongdoing” (p. 39). It responds to persistent (racial) injustice rather than an isolated incident. This sort of response, the author maintains, is “more likely to correctly represent racial injustice,” since “we live in a racist world” and “this particular type of rage represents the world” (p. 39).
Regarding the productive aspect of this variety of anger, Cherry claims that Lordean rage both “recognizes and advertises” the worth of justice. It registers that “a better world is worth desiring, imagining, creating, and fighting for” (p. 53). Moreover, Lordean rage shines a spotlight on racism when racism is often ignored or challenged by those who “uphold racist structures” and prefer that racism not be acknowledged or discussed (p. 57). By both calling attention to moral problems and informing action, Lordean rage “can fuel positive action directed toward ending racial injustice and creating an anti-racist world” (p. 62).
The Case for Rage excellently considers anger within the context of ongoing racial injustice. This is especially useful given how often racism is downplayed or outright denied. Discussing gaslighting in this regard, Cherry discusses how frequently Lordean rage is disregarded by others who point to other displays of anger within racial contexts, such as those mentioned above, as unproductive or an overreaction. These challengers question racial anger, turning attention back on those feeling it rather than the realities that incite it, thereby discounting the experiences of racism and racial injustice.
As Cherry points out, “gaslighting is a tool of manipulation employed to make those who have anti-racist anger question and doubt their experiences, judgments, and thus their emotions in response to racism” (p. 59). She makes a strong case in support of such anger, thereby validating it while simultaneously undermining the intent behind gaslighting. Cherry explains, “[A]nger against racism that aims toward real change … can be fitting, appropriate, and correct. We cannot let those who wish to silence anti-racist anger be the ones who get to evaluate it” (p. 59).
This book is philosophical in its approach, both in an academic sense and in terms of how it consistently thinks through ideas and concepts to question and expand on them. Its message will benefit both scholars and lay readers by presenting how Lordean rage can be fostered and implemented in service of a better world. This optimistic view is validating in the wake of ongoing racial injustices. Ultimately, Cherry offers Lordean rage as fuel for action.
--M. K. Bloodsworth-Lugo, Washington State University Vancouver